In federal societies, intergovernmental relations are necessarily a part of political life.
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given the somewhat precarious and evolving nature of federal societies and the role which minority language groups can play in "making or breaking" a federation. The topic is also of interest because many federal states must consider the accommodation of minority language groups, and comparative studies generate much-needed policy approaches, and assess the applicability of these approaches to different federal scenarios.
Since the issue chosen for study is a relatively complicated and considered one, how do I intend to support my contention that the Dominant Variables do dominate the outcomes in this policy sector? Basically, I propose that the primary influence of the Dominant Variables can be deduced from the following factors: the reflection of the variables in the policy outcomes themselves; and, the evolution of the policy outcomes in direct consonance with the evolution of the variables themselves. Moreover, while the variables of primary importance are the same as between the Countries, the way in which the Dominant Variables manifest themselves is different, and this difference explains the divergent policy outcomes in the Countries.
While I draw on the existing literature to build these arguments, the scholars of Belgian and Canadian language policies who precede me point to the influence of either or both of the Dominant Variables, though fail to question the influence of the variables from the "macro" point of view of "what matters to policy outcomes" and fail to link the influence of the variables back to the content of the policy. I intend to address this gap and complete the analysis by reviewing both the influence of the Dominant Variables and their specific effect on policy outcomes.
In terms of the structure of this essay, I proceed in two parts. In the first part, I
provide important background information concerning both the framework of federalism and the minority language policy outcomes in both of the Countries. In the second part, I
propose which variables affected the divergent policy outcomes in the federal societies under review. In this section I undertake the analysis described briefly above, and argue why the Dominant Variables can be asserted as dominant and how they have been integrated into policy outcomes.
Before undertaking any of this analysis however, I begin with a brief discussion of my methodology and the basis of comparison of the Countries.
APPROACH A. Methodology
In terms of methodology I propose to proceed in my comparative analysis as follows:
• Define the Framework of Federalism: In order to define the framework of federalism at issue in the two federations, I review two indicators, the constitutional arrangements and the institutional arrangements. As to the former, I identify which levels of governments have which powers in the area of minority language rights. As to the latter, I determine what institutional arrangements (formal and informal) are at work between levels of government concerning this policy sector.
• Define the Policy Outcome: In order to define the policy outcome, I delineate the scope of the policy sector, and determine which aspect of "minority language rights" I will review. I intend to define minority language rights by reference to two indicators: language of government services and language of (elementary/secondary) educational instruction. Having delimited the policy sector itself, I then define policy outcomes in the Countries by reference to these two indicators.
• Explain the Convergent and/or Divergent Policy Outcomes:
• In this section, I determine which factors primarily affect the policy outcomes and argue how I am able to assess their primary influence. I propose that the Dominant Variables were influential in the Countries, though towards different policy outcomes.
• I define the Dominant Variables as follows: relative situation of language groups refers to the numerical, economic and social importance of the language group, by reference to other language groups in society; political culture is the commitment to equality between language groups.
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• While other variables certainly played a secondary role (such as the judiciary, civil society and political actors) given the relative brevity of this paper, I will not explore these variables of secondary influence. Instead, I will restrict my analysis to the two variables which I assert played a dominant role.
• I assess the influence of the Dominant Variables by evaluating how the variables are reflected within the policy outcomes and by evaluating how changes in the variables engendered changes in policy.
Having proposed the above methodology, I should address why I chose the Countries as my case studies, as well as my basis for comparison between the two.
B. Basis for Comparison
For this study, I sought similar federal countries so that the study could produce a reasoned analysis of what causal factors affected policy outcomes, and how those causal factors manifested themselves, amongst similar federations.
Of course, no two countries are the same; however, both Canada and Belgium are to some extent more similar than many. For example, both countries contain medium/small sized populations, a majority/minorities division along linguistic lines and a federal structure. Both countries are also relatively wealthy and have well-established democracies. Of course, there are many dissimilarities, such as the age of the federations and the geographic situation of the Countries. However, the similarities are significant and perfect matches can not be found. Thus, in this study, I should be able to assess, with some assuredness, what the causal factors at issue in this policy area are, and conclude that divergent (or convergent) policy outcomes are due to the particular manifestation of these causal factors in the Countries rather than due to the radically distinct situations of the Countries themselves. 
BELGIUM
Concerning language, the Belgian constitution divides power between levels of governments and sets out important linguistic divisions and responsibilities within Belgian society and government.
As to the division of powers, the community level of government has primacy in language issues. More exactly, beginning with the 1970 constitutional reforms, responsibility for "cultural affairs" was devolved from the federal to the community level of government. 2 Cultural affairs were later defined to include language as well as nearly all aspects of education.
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The federal government has limited powers respecting language rights. In terms of education, the federal government retains responsibility for general norms (such as the qualification and retirement age of teachers) only. In terms of government services, the federal government apparently lacks specific constitutional jurisdiction, although the parameters of its obligations are set out in statute (described below).
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In terms of imposing linguistic divisions and responsibilities, the constitution recognizes 3 geographic regions (Walloon, Flanders and Brussels-Capital) and three cultural communities (French, Flemish and German). 5 The communities are granted full 2 M. Jaumain, "Some Features of Cultural Policies Applied in Belgium, Particularly in the French-Speaking Community," Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1997) pp. 205-225 at 208. 3 Id., at 209. 4 K.D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1986) at 161-9. 5 Articles 2 and 3 of the Belgian Constitution. The regions (Flanders, Walloon and Brussels-Capital) are territorially defined, while the communities (Flemish, French and German) are defined according to language and culture. But these communities also rest largely on a territorial basis: the authority of the Flemish community extends over Flanders plus the Flemish speaking population of Brussels, while the authority of the French community extends over Walloon (minus its German speaking communes) plus the 6 legislative power over specified areas (as described above). The Communities' jurisdiction extends to their respective language regions, and to the French and Flemish speakers of the Brussels region respectively. The constitution guarantees linguistic parity between French and Flemish ministers in the national cabinet.
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CANADA
The Canadian constitution also both divides power and defines certain linguistic rights.
As to the division of powers, the constitution 7 does not specifically assign language to either level of government. Accordingly, a law prescribing the use of language is characterized as a law in relation to the institutions or activities that the enactment covers, rather than in relation to language.
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As to rights, the constitution sets out specific language rights. The Constitution Act, 1867 (C.A. 1867) contains only one provision of interest to our discussion.
Specifically, it provides that the provincial legislature can make laws in relation to education. Flowing from this right, the province has the power to delineate the language of instruction in schools. However, Section 93 prohibits a legislature from prejudicially affecting rights or privileges respecting denominational schools existing by law at the time of confederation in 1867. 9 Thus, if a language of instruction was a right or privilege of a denomination school in a province at confederation, the province is prevented from compelling the denominational school to instruct in a different language.
The Consitution Act, 1982 Act, (C.A. 1982 contains a more elaborate set of language rights touching on the language of the legislature, government services and education. In terms of government services, sections 16 and 20 set out the relevant obligations.
According to Section 16, English and French are the official languages of Canada and New Brunswick. According to Section 20, the (federal and New Brunswick) governments are obliged to provide bilingual services to the public. 10 The other nine provinces of Canada have not undertaken any constitutional obligation to provide government services in both official languages, although as discussed below, some choose to do so.
In terms of education, Section 23 of the C.A. 1982 protects minority language education rights. In essence, 3 categories of parents are entitled to "qualified" minority language education rights for their children. The 3 categories are: parents whose mother tongue is in the minority (Section 23(1)(a)); 11 parents whose language of primary school instruction in Canada is in the minority (Section 23(1)(b)); and, parents who have or had another child enrolled in a minority language of instruction in Canada (Section 23(2)).
These rights are all subject to the "where numbers warrant" qualification of Section 23(3)
Newfoundland. Quebec and Newfoundland have since undertaken a constitutional amendment and created language school boards. For a complete discussion, please see Hogg, supra, note 7 at Section 53.8(b). 10 C.A. 1982, at Sections 16 and 20. Specifically, the federal obligation attaches to any head or central office of an institution of Parliament or the Government of Canada. It further attaches to any other office of the Government of Canada where either there is significant demand for bilingual services from that office; or, due to the "nature of the office" it is "reasonable" that bilingual services be provided by that office. The New Brunswick obligation is unqualified, and attaches to "any office of an institution of the Legislature or Government of New Brunswick." 11 As per Section 59 of the C.A. 1982, Section 23(1)(a) does not apply to Quebec until its Legislative Assembly decides to adopt it. The result is that English speaking parents in Quebec have no right to send their children to English speaking schools, unless they fit into the second or third category of parents recognized by s. 23.
8 which has been interpreted as providing a "sliding scale of entitlement" based on the number of children whose parents qualify.
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Having considered the constitutional background to the policy outcomes in the minority language sector, it is equally important to consider the institutional background.
B. Framework of Federalism: Institutional Considerations
Neither Belgium nor Canada has highly-developed institutions of intergovernmental relations relating to minority language rights.
BELGIUM
Belgium has certain institutions representing both intra-and inter-state federalism concerning minority language rights. As to intra-state federalism, the Belgian Senate was intended to be a regional body, with a portion of the senators directly elected, and another portion elected from the ranks of the communities. 13 In addition to the parity requirement for federal cabinet, the executive requires overall legislative support and the consent of a majority of legislators within their linguistic groups. The executive also decides by consensus, giving French and Dutch speakers a mutual veto-right. Finally, any constitutional amendment or legislative enactment touching upon regional issues must be approved by two-thirds of the MPs in the federal lower house and senate, including a majority of each of the linguistic groups (in both houses).
14 As to inter-state federalism, the constitution contains an "alarm bell" procedure which initiates a Conciliation Committee. 15 An assembly pulls an "alarm bell" when it perceives that the initiative of another assembly could cause it serious harm. The 20 There are also informal institutions at work. While it is difficult to place a label on such informal structures, several authors cite their existence and influence.
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Moreover, the results of such informal relations are clear in the realm of both services and education. Relating to services, the federal government has entered into federalprovincial agreements to assist provincial governments provide services to official language minority communities. 22 Relating to education, in addition to the "formal work" of the CMEC, the informal relations between governments have netted bilateral agreements to provide ad hoc support for special educational measures such as the establishment of post-secondary institutions.
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Given this background concerning federalism, it is now worthwhile to consider the background concerning policy outcomes. 19 The purpose of this organization seems to be primarily to co-ordinate efforts and exchange information. 
C. Framework of Policy Outcomes
Minority language rights could be defined broadly or narrowly. Given the comparative brevity of this paper, I have chosen a relatively narrow definition of minority language rights -namely, access to government services and instruction in (elementary and secondary) education in one's language of birth. I review the content of language policies, by reference to these two indicators, for both of the Countries in the upcoming section.
BELGIUM GOVERNMENT SERVICES
The policy outcome concerning government services in Belgium is theoretically quite simple. In brief, Flanders and Walloon are officially unilingual language regions, functioning in Flemish and French respectively while the Brussels region is officially bilingual. The general rule for the national public service is bilingualism of service but unilingualism of employees. 24 These policies were the result of essentially 2 waves of legislative reform. In the first wave of 1932 the general principles were established, whereas in the second wave of 1963, the enforcement of the principles was reinforced and certain loopholes were closed.
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EDUCATION
Similar to government services, in education, waves of reform resulted in a policy of unilingual instruction according to region. Specifically, according to the 1932 law, the language of instruction in Flanders, Walloon (and the German cantons) is the language of the region, whereas the language of instruction in Brussels is the child's mother tongue or 24 McRae, supra, note 4 at 151. It should be noted as well that the much smaller German speaking area in the Liege province (in Walloon) also functions unilingually. The German aspects to Belgian language policy are relatively insignificant and will not be pursued in this paper. 25 McRae, supra, note 4 at 189-91.
usual language. However, given some loopholes in the law of July 1932, allowing children to be educated in a language other than that of the region, following 1932, Flanders had a mostly Francophone system. 26 Thus, the 1963 law was promulgated to apply the principles of the 1932 law more extensively and rigorously.
Essentially, in addition to affirming the two general principles of the 1932 reform, the 1963 law provided that minority education facilities at the elementary level would only be available, at a specific level of demand, for four groups of communes with minority language populations. Moreover, in order to qualify for "mother tongue"
language of instruction, enrolment could only take place after a parental declaration of mother tongue which was then checked by a special linguistic inspectorate.
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This regime, dependent upon the language of the region, exists to date, although responsibility for education (and all matters concerning language) has since been devolved to the community level.
CANADA GOVERNMENT SERVICES
It is useful to review the language of government services in terms of federal and provincial services. In terms of federal services, the government's main commitments are set out in Section 20 of the C. A. 1982 and Section 2 of the Official Languages Act of 1969. 28 As described above, overall, the federal government has adopted a "panCanadian" approach and undertaken to provide services in either French or English, based on the citizen's choice, at any government head office, and at any other office, whenever it is either reasonable, or there is sufficient demand therefore. given the lack of an absolute standard, existing efforts may not continue to meet constitutional scrutiny. In fact, recent S.C.C. cases have chastised provinces for failing to properly implement their Section 23 obligations. 30 Thus overall, the level of minority language education across the provinces could be considered both inconsistent and evolving.
Against this background of both the federalist and the policy framework, it is appropriate to now discuss which factors caused minority language rights policies to develop as they did. I will begin this analysis with a discussion of the influence of the relative situation of language groups.
PART II: DISCUSSION
A. Relative Situation of Language Groups
I. NUMERICAL IMPORTANCE REFLECTED IN THE POLICY OUTCOME
According to this argument, the relative situation of language groups can be asserted as a dominant influence on policy outcome because the numerical importance of the language group is so neatly reflected within the policy outcome itself. In other words, I can argue that the relative situation of the minority language group has causally affected policy 29 Second, the relative situation of language groups extends beyond numerical importance and as the subsequent argument will detail. Francophones in Canada have enjoyed emerging relative importance in Canada (beyond their numbers), and this emerging importance helps further explain the content of the federal policy outcomes. I turn to this argument now.
II. AS THE RELATIVE SITUATION OF LANGUAGE GROUPS CHANGE, SO DOES THE CONTENT OF THE POLICIES
According to this argument, the influence of the relative situation of language groups on policy outcomes can be measured by observing how policy outcomes change in keeping with changes to the relative situation of language groups. At the provincial level (outside Quebec), the effects of the changing situation of language groups on policy can be observed as well. For example, the emergence of Francophone "power" prompted all of the provinces to take some action to extend their minority language services. For example, in 1977 (following the 1976 Parti Quebecois election) the nine (non-Quebec) premiers adopted a declaration agreeing that they would 1986, French was extended to become an official language of the entire provincial court system for criminal matters. 54 Thus consistent with the argument, in those provinces with a changing situation between language groups, policy changes came about in reaction to that changing situation. However, in those provinces without any emerging Francophone power, there was also no corresponding change in policy.
While the relative situation of language groups explains to a meaningful degree the policy outcomes in this sector, it does not explain all. In order to shed further light on the "causes" of the content of minority language rights policies I turn now to consider the influence of political culture.
B. Political Values and Culture
For this discussion, I propose two arguments in support of the dominant causal influence of political culture on policy outcomes in this sector. First, I argue that the causal influence of political culture can be asserted based on how clearly the political values are reflected within policy outcomes; and second, I argue that the influence of political culture can be measured by observing how policy outcomes shift to respond to threats to political values. 53 Id., at 14; Covell, supra, note 38 at 243; Prevost & Beaud, supra, note 32 at 106. 54 Churchill, supra, note 21 at 39.
I. POLITICAL VALUES ARE REFLECTED IN THE POLICY OUTCOMES
Belgium has always officially extolled its commitment to equality between French and Flemish and this commitment, and the response thereto, has been neatly reflected in policies. In terms of a commitment to equality, as McRae points out, in Belgium:
…every question on the political agenda has been scrutinized closely from a linguistic and regional standpoint, and appropriate balances have been sought….political tendency …to demand an equilibrium between Flanders and Wallonie in all policy decisions.
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M. Jaumain also comments on the enduring commitment to equality in Belgian society.
Jaumain notes that there are several pillars in Belgian society and that each pillar works to reach agreements that reflect the proportional influence of each group.
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This commitment to equality has been clearly integrated into language policies.
McRae calls the "absolute equality of the two official languages" one of the four principles of Belgian language legislation. 57 While not repeated here, as described above, French and Flemish are treated equally by statute and by the constitution.
It is not universally accepted, however, that a commitment to equality is part of Belgium's political belief system. For example, Murphy argues that it is not a commitment to equality which motivates Belgian society, but rather, what motivates is the "double minority complex" and a desire within the two groups to be separate and apart. According to Murphy, the Flemings have minority feelings because of their traditional linguistic disadvantage and economic stagnation while the Walloons began to suffer from minoritization in the 1960s due to their economic and demographic decline, which began following WWII. Murphy completes the thought and argues that in terms of policy outcomes, because of the double minority complex, language became organized along ethno(-regional) lines so that each language group could avoid feeling dominated by the other.
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I am not prepared to resolve this debate today, and conclude whether it was indeed the quest for equality or the double-minority complex which is in fact reflected within Belgium's existing language regime. However, it is worthwhile to note the debate and note that regardless of which aspect of political culture motivated the content of the policy, it was clearly political culture (however you circumscribe it) which influenced policy outcomes and which is encapsulated therein. In other words, there is an unwavering commitment to equality at the federal level, though a wavering commitment to equality at the provincial level. This fluctuating interpretation of the political value of equality is clearly reflected in policy outcomes.
The influential role of political culture can also be measured by observing how policies change in defense of threatened political values. I turn to this argument next.
II. AS POLITICAL VALUES ARE THREATENED, POLICY OUTCOMES WILL CHANGE TO PROTECT THOSE VALUES
According to this argument, one can measure the influence of political culture by observing how the policy outcomes change to protect the political value, as the political value is threatened.
This argument is well-illustrated in the Belgian example. In Belgium, as described above, there is a commitment to equality, but there has also been a reconfiguration of relative power in favour of the Flemings. This rebalance between
Fleming and French has contributed to the "downgrading" of the idea of "Belgian-ness" in favour of regional-linguistic association, 68 which can of course be perceived as a "threat" to the commitment to equality. Arguably, it is difficult to preserve the value of equality against this threat, but language policy has responded with some protective measures. Specifically, as the commitment to equality was threatened by the evolving Flemish movement and Walloon response thereto, equality was continually reinforced.
For example, during the 1970 constitutional amendments, article 86 was promulgated to guarantee parity between French and Flemish speakers in the national cabinet. Further, the language laws of 1963 reinforced the rule that national public services are bilingual but employees are unilingual. This formula was apparently adopted to protect the equality of Walloons within the public service. 69 Thus, while Belgian society has undergone some fundamental changes which challenge the commitment to equality, language policy has responded by protecting equality, rather than discounting it.
In Canada the dominant influence of political culture can also be gauged by considering how policy outcomes have evolved in response to threats to the equality guarantee. The argument in the Canadian context is best illustrated by reviewing the evolution of language laws in Quebec. Specifically, in Quebec, it is compellingly argued that the province's language regime, which promotes French and demotes English, was actually prompted by the threat to equality created by the federal government's inadequate language policies.
In greater detail, as described above, the B&B Commission enunciated a commitment to equality between French and English speakers in Canada, and recommended a language regime which allowed either Anglophone or Francophone
Canadians to "feel at home", anywhere in the country. 70 In Quebec's view, this panCanadian approach was inadequate to protect French and promote it to a position of equivalence with English in Canada. Instead, as Schmidt argues, Quebec believed that in order to establish equality in a bilingual country, against the tide of English, Quebec needed to be unilingually French. In Schmidt's words:
Quebec's rationale for Bill 101's illiberal policy of restrictiveness was based on its understanding of the seriousness of the linguistic and cultural crisis faced by francophones in overwhelmingly anglophone North America….Because inequality between the two language groups was a fact of life from the time of the Conquest, there were reasons to believe that the individualistic premises of the liberal pluralist policy of the federal government would not succeed in protecting the survival of the Quebecois language and culture, much less ensure their elevation to the position of equality. First, as I outlined in my introduction, outcomes in this policy sector are more responsive to normative variables than institutional ones. But, will this dichotomy hold, or, will institutional variables begin to assert more influence over policy outcomes? For example, will tensions between language groups in Belgium reach a level such that the alarm-bell procedure is invoked to change the trajectory of a language initiative; or, will the CMEC become an organization of force, and co-operate with the federal government to institute genuine policy change respecting French language instruction in Canada?
Only continued observation of this policy sector can answer these questions.
Second, even if the Dominant Variables continue to hold sway over policy outcomes in this sector, will they engender policy outcomes in line with past outcomes, or will they engender different policy outcomes? For example, will the double-minority complex in Belgium become so deeply entrenched that the current language laws are irrelevant and Belgians begin to question the purpose of the federation? Or, will the relative situation of the Francophone minority outside Quebec become so weak that it 30 loses its claim to language rights and the commitment to equality becomes absurd?
These and other questions will also likely arise in the future; and again, it will be useful to continue to monitor this policy sector to observe how and if the Dominant Variables influence policy outcomes in the future.
Third, I found that IGR did not make a significant difference to policy outcomes in the minority language rights sector. Why? Perhaps it is because the arena of minority language rights is so politically charged that institutionalizing the debate would create nothing but additional conflict. However, certain authors disagree and suggest that institutionalizing the arena would not create conflict, but rather, would channel and resolve the debate, converting it from a sensitive topic to a manageable dialogue. 75 Since my paper focused on what factors did make a difference, I did not explore this discussion.
As a student of IGR, though, I can not resist flagging it and identifying it as a topic of curiosity and interest. I therefore conclude with a short warning: perhaps a future paper
will consider not what does matter to minority language rights, but why IGR does not! 
